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We use a multi-factor asset pricing model to investigate whether
fluctuations in industry stock returns are due to industry-specific
shocks or to monetary and other macroeconomic factors. We find
that common factors explain a substantial portion of the variation
in stock returns, indicating that economic fluctuations are not due
to industry-specific factors alone. We also find that
disinflationary monetary policy harms both small and large firms
while expansionary policy benefits large but not small firms.
These results have mixed implications for the view that credit
market frictions propagate monetary shocks_.
- ‘_I. Introduction
What causes business cycle fluctuations? Do they arise from
real factors such as productivity shocks and taste changes, or do
nominal factors such as changes in monetary policy also matter? If
monetary factors affect real variables, what are the channels
transmitting policy changes to the economy? This paper addresses
these questions by examining the response of stock returns to
monetary policy shocks and other macroeconomic variables. It finds
that these common
variation in stock
are not due to
factors explain a substantial portion of the
returns, indicating that economic fluctuations
real factors alone. It also finds that
disinflationary monetary policy harms both small and large firms
while expansionary policy benefits large but not small firms.
These results have mixed implications for the view that one channel
of monetary transmission occurs through its impact of bank loans
and on firms' balance sheets. These findings also indicate that
small firms bear a.greater burden than large firms from changes in
monetary policy.
Previous researchers have uncovered evidence that monetary
policy and other macroeconomic variables affect the real economy.
Bernanke and Blinder [3], using Granger causality tests and
variance decompositions from a VAR, have shown that innovations in
the funds rate over the 1959:7 - 1989:12 period forecasted
industrial production, unemployment, and other real variables well.
Romer and Romer [20], using a narrative approach, have documented
six episodes over the postwar period when anti-inflationary
monetary policy was followed by declines in unemployment andindustrial
that money
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production. Gali [12], using a VAR methodology, finds




output variability at a five- to ten- quarter
[24] used a different tack to test real models of
economic fluctuations against those emphasizing the real effects of
monetary, fiscal, and other macroeconomic variables. He
investigated the fraction of the variation in industrial production
growth that was due to industry-specific shocks and to nation-
specific shocks. He reasoned that in real business cycle models,
industry-specific shocks should be more important than nation-
specific shocks. On the other hand, in models emphasizing the real
effects of monetary and other macroeconomic policies, nation-
specific shocks should be more important than industry-specific
shocks. Using a variance components technique and panel data from
eight OECD countries, he found that both industry-specific and
nation-specific shocks are empirically important. Thus he
concluded that technology or taste changes alone do not explain
most macroeconomic fluctuations.'
The evidence supporting monetary business cycle models has
been accompanied by research investigating whether monetary policy
matters in part because of its influence on bank loans and on
firms' balance sheets. Bernanke and Blinder [2] have shown in an
IS-LM model that if bonds and bank loans are imperfect substitutes,
then an open market sale by the Federal Reserve that decreases
reserves will also decrease loans. If certain firms have3
difficulty obtaining credit from other sources, then the reduction
in bank loans will lower capital investment and aggregate demand.
Gertler and Gilchrist [15] have discussed how a monetary
tightening, by increasing interest rates, can worsen cash flow net
of interest and thus firms' balance sheet positions. If firms
prefer internal finance to external finance, then the diminished
liquidity will lower investment and aggregate demand.
Gertler and Gilchrist have argued that smaller firms are more
likely to be constrained in their access to credit. They are more
likely to obtain funds from banks than from equity, bonds, or
commercial paper. They are less likely to be well collateralized.
Building on this insight, Gertler and Gilchrist [I51 and
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans [8] have investigated whether
small and large firms respond differently to monetary policy
shocks. Gertler and Gilchrist found that sales and inventory
investment fall substantially more for small firms than for large
firms following a monetary contraction. Gertler and Gilchrist and
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans found that total borrowing and
bank loans by small firms decrease following a monetary tightening
while total borrowing and bank loans by large firms increase.
These results are consistent with the view that monetary policy
- ‘__
affects real variables in part because of its influence on bank
loans and on firms' balance sheets. These results are also of
independent interest, as Bernanke [l] has argued, because they
imply that small firms bear a disproportionate burden from
disinflationary monetary policy.4
Gertler and Gilchrist ([15], p. 313) make clear that they are
investigating the variability of small firms that is correlated
with common factors, not that which is due to l*idiosyncratic  risk".
Another way of examining this is through the use of multi-factor
asset pricing models (e.g., Ross [21] and Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross
Cl011 - In these models, assets must pay risk premia to compensate
for their exposures to common factors but not for their exposures
to idiosyncratic risks.
Ri - X, in a multi-factor
Ri - x, =
As developed by Ross [21], excess returns
framework can be written:
CjPi,jXj  +  CjPi,jfj +  Ei (1)
where Ri is the return on asset i, X, is the risk-free rate, pi..i is
the exposure of asset i to macroeconomic variable j, Xj is the risk
premium associated with factor j, fj is the unexpected change in
macroeconomic variable j, and ei is a mean-zero error term. The
expression CjPi,jXj represents the expected return on asset i,  CjPi,jfj
represents the systematic component of the unexpected return, and
Ei represents the idiosyncratic component of the unexpected return.
There are several advantages to using stock return data to
infer whether monetary policy matters and if so why. First, it
- __
enables us to learn the dynamic effects of monetary policy on firm
performance. Theory posits that stock prices equal the expected
present value of firms' future payouts. As Shapiro [22] has noted,
these payouts ultimately must reflect economic activity, implying
that industry stock prices should be related to future real5
activity in that industry. Black [4] has similarly argued that an
increase in stock prices in a sector more often than not presages
an increase in sales, earnings, and capital outlays in that sector.
Thus examining how monetary policy innovations affect industry
stock returns can shed light on how monetary shocks affect industry
output. Second, stock returns are useful for achieving the
decomposition discussed by Stockman ~241. The first two
expressions on the right side of (1) represent the effects of
macroeconomic factors on asset returns while the third expression
captures the effects of industry-specific factors. Third, by using
stock returns for large and small firms, one can gauge the relative
effects of monetary policy shocks on large and small firms. This
in turn sheds light on whether monetary policy affects real
variables because of the influence of monetary policy on bank loans
and on firm balance sheets.
Using a nonlinear seemingly unrelated regression technique and
asset returns on 39 portfolios we find that innovations in monetary
policy and other macroeconomic variables explain on average 32
percent of the variation in stock returns. These findings indicate
that models relying on industry-specific productivity shocks or
taste changes leading to sectoral reallocations are not sufficient
to explain business fluctuations. We also find that in 96 percent
of the cases examined a monetary tightening depresses stock prices.
This result supports monetary business cycle models over those
emphasizing real factors alone. Finally, we find that while small
and large company stocks were both harmed by disinflationary6
monetary policy during the Volcker deflation, small firms were not
helped while large firms were by the subsequent monetary expansion.
This finding has mixed implications for the credit view of monetary
transmission. It also indicates that small firms bear a larger
burden than large firms from changes in monetary policy.
Section II presents the methodology and data employed.
Section III contains the results. Section IV discusses the
findings. Section V concludes.
II. Data and Methodology
Econometric Methodology
This paper uses a nonlinear seemingly unrelated regression
(NLSUR) technique developed by Gallant [13] and McElroy and
Burmeister [19]. Equation (1) can be rewritten:
Ei = Cj(fj  + Aj)Pij + Ei (2)
where Ei = R - ho. Stacking equation (2) for all N assets produces
a system that can be estimated by NLSUR. This system imposes the
cross-equation restrictions that the intercepts for each equation
depend on the risk premia (the Xj's) and the risk-free rate (A,).
As McElroy and Burmeister note, the estimates of the risk premia
and the exposures obtained using this method are, even without
normally distributed errors, strongly consistent and asymptotically *
normally distributed. Thus this procedure is robust to the non-7
normality endemic to asset price data.
Asset Returns
To measure the effect of monetary policy shocks on stock
returns for different-sized firms we used the same data set
employed by Campbell and Mei [5]. These data were for ten value-
weighted common stock portfolios sorted by decile based on market
capitalization. These stocks were all listed on the New York Stock
Exchange. Table 1 provides summary statistics for these data and
average market capitalization by decile. These decile stock return
data are available until December 1987. In addition, data for the
industries listed in Table 2 were also employed.* The one month
Treasury bill rate was used as the risk-free rate and subtracted
from the portfolio returns before estimation.
Sample Period
The Federal Reserve employed different operating procedures in
recent years. During the September 1974 - September 1979 period,
as Cook and Hahn [9] have documented, the Fed used the federal
funds rate as its intermediate target. Over the October 1979 -
August (or October) 1982, the Fed used nonborrowed reserves as its
operating target. After August (or October) 1982, the Fed returned
to targeting short term interest rates. The ambiguity concerning
when the Fed reverted back to interest rate targeting comes
because, while the Fed officially acknowledged changing its
operating procedures in October 1982, it actually started changing8
procedures during the summer of 1982 (See Greider, 1987).
Because the Fed has used different intermediate targets over
recent years we estimate equation (2) over two sample periods:
the first (1974:9 - 1979:9 and 1982:8 - 1987:9) when the Fed
targeted short term interest rates and the second (1979:lO -
1982:lO) when the Fed targeted nonborrowed reserves. Over the
first period we measure monetary policy using innovations in the
federal funds rate and over the second period using innovations in
nonborrowed reserves. Although our stock return data extend to
December 1987, we truncate the sample at September 1987 to avoid
anomalous effects that could arise from including the October 1987
stock market crash in our sample. The second sample period extends
to October 1982 rather than August because the Jacobian cross-
products matrix was not of full rank when the sample ended in
August, causing some of the estimates to be biased. For those
estimates that were not biased (including those for the ten decile
stock returns) the results were similar whether the sample ended in
August or October.3
The 1979:lO - 1982:lO sample is also of interest because this
short period includes two recessions, the second of which ended in
1982:lO. This second recession brought the unemployment rate to a
postwar high of 11 percent. Gertler and Gilchrist [15] argued
that, because credit constraints bind a larger number of small
firms in a downturn, changes in monetary policy should have a
larger effect on small firms in bad times than in good times. The
1979:10-1982:lO period is useful for examining whether monetary9
policy has a larger effect on small firms in bad times.
Macroeconomic Factors
We measured monetary policy using innovations in both the
federal funds rate and in nonborrowed reserves. To measure
unexpected changes in these variables we
[81- They measured innovations in the
followed Christian0 et al.
federal funds rate and in
.
nonborrowed reserves as residuals from a vector autoregression that
included lagged values of real GDP, the GDP deflator, an index of
commodity prices, the funds rate, nonborrowed reserves, and total
reserves. They found that including commodity prices in the
regression obviated the "price puzzle" by which tighter monetary
policy as measured by innovations in the funds rate and in
nonborrowed reserves appeared to cause higher prices.
Since we are using monthly rather than quarterly data we
employed industrial production growth rather than GDP and the CPI
inflation rate rather than the GDP deflator. Otherwise we used the
same variables employed by Christian0 et al. We included six lags
of each of the variables in our regressions. The residuals from
the regressions with the funds rate and nonborrowed reserves as
dependent variables were used to measure unexpected changes in
monetary policy. Since data on commodity prices were available
from Haver Analytics beginning in January 1967, these regressions
were performed over the 1967:l - 1987:9 period.
Apart from innovations in monetary 'policy, the other factors
employed were the same used by Chen, Roll, and Ross  [7]. They used10
the corporate bond/Treasury bond spread (the default premium), the
Treasury bond/Treasury bill spread (the horizon premium), the






in expected inflation. To calculate unexpected
first determined the expected real rate on a one-
bill using the method of Fama and Gibbons [ll].
this from the nominal Treasury bill rate (known at
.
of the month) to calculate expected inflation.
Unexpected inflation was set equal to the difference between actual
inflation and expected inflation. The change in expected inflation
was set equal to the first difference of the expected inflation
series. Chen, Roll, and Ross argued that each of the series that
they used, being either the difference between asset returns or
very noisy, could be treated as innovations. The data sources are
discussed in the appendix.
III. Results
Tables 2 and 3 present the exposures (the fiij's) of asset
returns to monetary policy and the R*/s for each equation.' Table
2 measures monetary policy using innovations in the federal funds
rate and Table 3 using innovations in nonborrowed reserves. Of the
39 exposures in Table 2, all but 4 are negative (indicating that a
monetary tightening depresses stock returns). 25 of the exposures
are significant at at least the '10 percent level and 20 at 'at least
the 5 percent level. Of the 31 exposures in Table 3, all arepositive (indicating that a monetary tightening depresses stock
returns). 22 of the exposures are significant at at least the 10
percent level and 18 at at least the 5 percent level. The R2r~ over
the two Tables average 0.32, indicating that a nontrivial
percentage of the total sum of squares of stock returns is
explained by macroeconomic factors.
Equation (1) is useful for interpreting the magnitudes of
these exposures. It indicates that unexpected changes in the
federal funds rate (FFR) and in nonborrowed reserves (NBR) will
affect the return on asset i according to the expressions Pi.FFRfFFK
and Pi,NBRfNBR' The mean value of pi,,,, in Table 2 is -2.4 and the
mean value of Pi.NBR in Table 3 is 111. The mean absolute
innovations in FFR and NBR over the respective sample periods
covered in Tables 2 and 3 are 0.30 and 0.0147. Thus on average
news of FFR innovations will affect stock returns by 0.71 percent
per month and news of NBR innovations by 1.6 percent per month.
These compound to annual effects of 8.95 percent per month for FFR
innovations and 21.6 percent for NBR innovations. Thus news of
monetary policy changes are precipitating large changes in stock
returns over our sample periods. Equation (1) also indicates that
stocks' exposures to FFR and NBR influence expected returns
according to the expressions fliFFRhFFR and @tiNBRXNBR. A,,, equals -0.33
and is statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level and
xNBR equals -.00071 and is not statistically significant at the 5
percent level. The mean absolute value of fliFFR&R is then 0.78 and
the mean absolute value of fiSNBRANBR 0.08. These results imply that12
on average the expected return on a stock decreased by 0.78 percent
per month because of its exposure to the funds rate and by 0.08
percent per month because of its exposure to nonborrowed reserves.
The important implication of these findings is that an
unexpected tightening of monetary policy produces a large and
statistically significant decline in stock returns and that
macroeconomic variables explain a substantial portion of the
variation in stock returns. These findings present a challenge to
real business cycle models relying exclusively on industry-specific
shocks.
To investigate whether credit market frictions are one channel
of the monetary transmission mechanism we examined the differential
effects of monetary shocks on small versus large firms. Over the
longer 123 month period including both recessions and expansions,
stock returns for the lowest decile firms, which presumable have
the fewest collateralizable assets, are weakly correlated with
monetary policy shocks. As firm size increases, this correlation
increases almost monotonically. Also, over the first five deciles,
the magnitude of the exposures increases monotonically despite the
higher mean returns on lower decile portfolios that should ceteris
. .
paribus cause their exposures to be larger. Over the shorter 37
month period characterized by two recessions, both lowest decile
stocks and higher decile stocks are strongly correlated with
monetary policy innovations. To test whether small company stocks
are significant over the shorter period because nonborrowed
reserves innovations are used instead of funds rate innovations themodel was re-estimated over this period using funds rate
innovations. As shown in Table 4, when monetary policy is measured
using funds rate innovations lowest decile stocks remain highly
correlated with monetary policy innovations.
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The finding that monetary policy was not highly correlated
with small company stocks over the longer period characterized by
recession and expansion but was over the shorter period
characterized by recession suggests that small firms do not benefit
from a monetary expansion. To test whether this is so we re-
estimated the model over the 1982:8 - 1987:9 period (using funds
rate innovations to measure monetary policy). This period begins
with the monetary expansion of August 1982 and the continuous
recovery that many believe was sparked by the monetary expansion.
As Table 5 shows, small firms' stocks are not highly correlated
with monetary policy innovations over this period while larger
company stocks clearly are. These findings suggest that monetary
policy exerts an asymmetric effect on small firms' stocks.
Disinflationary monetary policy (as occurred during the Volcker
deflation) clearly harms small as well as large firms. During
subsequent expansions (as occurred over the 1982:8 - 1987:9 period)
small firms do not benefit much while large firms do. Thus small
firms appear to bear a disproportionate burden from changes in
monetary policy.
It is possible to gain further insight into the differential
effects of monetary policy .on small and large firms during
expansions by examining the magnitudes of the exposures for small14
and large firms. We can obtain rough estimates of what these
exposures mean for firms' payouts by using the standard present
value model if we assume that the discount rate can be calculated
using our multi-factor model and that the discount rate is constant
over the 5-year period. For a first decile firm a 1 percent
unexpected decrease in the federal funds rate produces a capital
gain of 2.3 percent while for a fifth decile firm it causes a
capital gain of 3.4 percent. Letting P, and P, be the prices of the
representative small and large firms before news of the federal
funds rate decrease and P,' and P,' be the prices after the news,
the exposures imply:
(P,' - PS)/P, = 0.023 and (PL' - PL)/PL = 0.034 (3)
Then, for both small and large firms' stocks:
P = div+,/(l+r) + div+,/(l+r)* + div+,/(l+r)3 + . . .
P' = div,,' /(l+r) + div+,'/(l+r)* + div+3'/(l+r)3+  . . . (4)
where P and P' are the prices of the stock before and after news of
the monetary expansion, div,, is the expected payout of the firm i
periods in the future, and r is the rate at which this payout is
capitalized. Equation (3) implies:
P'-P = (div'+I - div+,)/(l+r) + (div'+, - div+,)/(l+r)* + . . .
= Adiv+,/(l+r) + Adiv+,/(l+r)* + . . . (5)
To simplify the analysis, we assume that Adiv is constant. Then
P/-P = Adiv/r and:
(PS '-P,)I(P,'-P,) = Adiv,r;'/AdivLr,_-' (6)
Equation (3) implies:15
(PS '-Ps)/(PI_ I-PL) = Adiv,r,'/Adiv,rL-' = 0.023Ps/0.034P, (7)
Assuming the price of the representative small firm is less than or
equal to the price of the representative large firm,
AdivJAdiv, I 0.023r,/O.O34r, (8)
The monthly discount rate calculated using our multi-factor model
were 0.00666 for r,_ and 0.00642 for rs. Thus:
AdivJAdiv, I 0.702 (9)
Thus the standard present value model and estimates we obtained
using our multi-factor model imply that a monetary shock over the
1982-1987 period increases the payoff of small firms by only 70
percent of the payoff of large firms. Since the discount rates are
similar, this result is being driven by differences in expected
payouts and should carry over even if Adiv is not constant.
IV. Discussion
The finding that monetary policy shocks are only weakly
correlated with small firms returns over the 1982-1987 period
coupled with evidence that monetary shocks affect the payout of
large firms more than the payout of small firms seems inconsistent
with the findings of Gertler and Gilchrist [15], although the . .
asymmetric effects over good times and bad times is consistent. To
attempt to reconcile our evidence with theirs we consider their
findings using funds rate innovations, which are similar to our
monetary policy shocks. Over the entire period (including good
times and bad times) they do not find a statistically significant
difference in the response of large and small firms' sales to funds16
rate shocks. However, both they and Christian0 et al. find that
short term liabilities rise (fall) more for large firms than for
small firms following a contractionary (expansionary) monetary
policy shock. If during a monetary-induced expansion large and
small firms' sales increase by a similar amount but liabilities
decrease significantly more for large firms
then one would expect large company stocks
shedding of liabilities by large companies
would improve the financial health of the
financial performance.
There are a couple of problems with
however. First, the fact that funds rate
than for small firms,
to fare better. The
during the expansion
company and thus its
this interpretation,
shocks are affecting
small firms' sales should cause funds rate shocks to be more
strongly correlated with small firms' returns than they are.
Second, the behavior of short term debt in Figure 1 of Gertler and
Gilchrist [15] appears inconsistent with this hypothesis. Their
Figure 1 shows that at the time monetary policy turned expansionary
in late 1982, the rate of change in the growth of short term debt
for large companies became positive and the growth rate itself
quickly went from -10 percent to +4 percent. This appears
inconsistent with the hypothesis that it was a decumulation of debt
triggered by the monetary expansion that caused large firms' stocks
to outperform small firms' stocks. It is true that later in the
period there is some tendency for the debt of large firms to drop
relative to the debt of small firms. Thus the differential effects
of a monetary expansion on the debt of'large and small firms couldexplain why large firms'
firms' stocks to monetary
Another explanation
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stocks are more responsive than small
shocks.
for the attenuated effect of monetary
shocks on smaller firms is that wages and prices are more flexible
for smaller firms. Christian0 et al. have conjectured that the
increase in liabilities by firms following a monetary contraction
reflects the decline in cash flow due to decreased sales. The
increased borrowing is needed to cover nominal expenditures, which
are apparently rigid. If this is true then the fact that small
firms' liabilities do not increase as much suggests that they are
better able to reduce nominal expenditures during disinflations.
Being confronted with more adverse terms of credit, they have a
greater incentive to undertake difficult cuts. Large firms during
a recession would thus be better able to hoard labor than small
firms. During the subsequent recovery, this would cause large
firms' profits to outstrip small firms' profits for a couple of
reasons. First, given the fact that real wages are procyclical, if
some of the hoarded labor was paid nominal wages that were preset
during the recession while labor hired during the recovery was paid
spot market levels, unit labor costs might be greater for small
firms. Second, small firms would encounter hiring and training
- ‘__
costs that larger firms employing hoarded labor would not.5 Prices
also might be more flexible for small than for large firms because
the greater number of small firms in an industry might imply
greater competition and thus less ability for an individual firm to
set prices.18
Future research should investigate whether the attenuated
effect of monetary policy shocks on small firms' stock returns
relative to large firms' returns is due to a greater decumulation
of debt by large firms, greater wage and price flexibility by small
firms, or some other factor. One way to test whether small firms
have greater price flexibility than large firms would be to perform
a study such as Carlton's [6] examining whether the average time
between price changes is shorter for small firms than for large
firms.
V. Conclusion
This paper investigated the extent to which business cycle
fluctuations are due to monetary policy shocks and other
macroeconomic factors as opposed to industry-specific factors. The
results indicate that on average 32 percent of the variation in
stock returns is explained by macroeconomic factors and that news
of contractionary monetary policy triggers a large and
statistically significant decline in stock returns. These results
cast doubt on real business cycle models that emphasize exclusively
industry-specific productivity shocks or taste changes leading to
sectoral reallocations.
- ‘-
This paper has also investigated whether one channel of
monetary transmission occurs through the impact of monetary policy
shocks on returns of large and small firms. It found that
disinflationary monetary policy during the Volcker deflation harmed
both large and small firms. During the subsequent expansion,19
however, monetary policy was strongly correlated with large firms'
returns but weakly correlated with small firms' returns. These
results have mixed implications for the view that one channel of
monetary transmission occurs through its impact on bank loans and
on firms' balance sheets. Evidence that monetary policy changes
have a larger effect on small firms in bad times than in good times
is consistent with the fact that credit constraints bind a larger
. number of small firms in a downturn. However, evidence that
monetary policy shocks exert a larger effect on large firms during
good times seems inconsistent with the view that monetary policy
affects real variables because of credit market frictions. The
findings reported here also indicate that the monetary authorities
should be concerned about excessive tightening, not only because it
slows the overall economy but also because it causes harm to small
firms that will not be remedied by future expansionary policy.20
TABLE 1 Summary Statistics for Decile Portfolios"






















a. Average market capitalization was calculated based on data in
Ibbotson Associates [16] and was discounted back to the end
of 1987 using Ibbotson Associates data for stock returns on
large and small firms over that period.21
TABLE II Nonlinear Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimates of the
Exposures of Portfolio Returns to News of the Federal Funds Rate"
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*,** Significant at the 10% and 5% levels respectively.
a. The sample period is 1974:9-1979:9, 1982:8-1987:9. Each
equation has 117 degrees of freedom.22
TABLE III Nonlinear Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimates of the
Exposures of Portfolio Returns to News of Nonborrowed Reserves'
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*,** Significant at the 10% and 5% levels respectively.
a. The sample period is 1979:10-1982:lO. Each equation
has,.-31 degrees of freedom.23
TABLE IV Nonlinear Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimates of the

































*,** Significant at the 10% and 5% levels respectively.
a. The sample period is 1979:10-1982:lO. Each equation has
31 degrees of freedom.
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TABLE V Nonlinear Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimates of the
Exposures of Portfolio Returns to News of the Federal Funds Rate"
Portfolio Exposure t-statistic
First Decile (smallest) -2.27 -1.49
Second Decile‘ -2.60** -1.99
Third Decile -3.11** -2.35
Fourth Decile -3.29** -2.57
Fifth Decile -3.37** -2.66
Sixth Decile -2.94** -2.41
Seventh Decile -3.15** -2.62
Eighth Decile -2.63** -2.21
Ninth Decile -2.55** -2.25
Tenth Decile (largest) -2.13* -1.94
*,** Significant at the 10% and 5% levels respectively.
a. The sample period is 1982:8-1987:9. Each equation has
56 degrees of freedom.25
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Appendix
Data Sources
The data were obtained from various sources. Data on decile
stock returns were obtained from Jianping Mei. Data on other
portfolio returns were obtained from Standard and Poor's [23] and
from Ibbotson Associates [16]. Data on Treasury bill returns,
inflation, the horizon premium, and the default premium were
obtained from Ibbotson Associates. Data on industrial production,
the inflation rate, commodity prices, the federal funds rate, total
reserves, and nonborrowed reserves were obtained from the Haver
Analytics data tape. The Haver mnemonics for these variables were,
respectively, IPN, PCU, PZALL, FFED, FAPAT, and FARAN.28
Notes
* We thank Jianping Mei for providing us with the decile stock
return data.
1. Examining the importance of industry-specific shocks versus
macroeconomic shocks is actually useful for testing only a subset
of RBC models, those emphasizing industry-specific productivity
shocks or taste changes producing sectoral reallocations (e.g.,
Long and Plosser [173). However, as'Lougani [18] has argued, since
aggregate productivity shocks have little explanatory power for
aggregate investment and for the recessions of 1974-1975 and 1981-
82, multiple sector RBC models are in many ways more promising than
single sector RBC models.
2. Three of these portfolios (high grade common stock, low priced
common stock, and small company stock) were included to spread
cross-sectional returns over a wider range. As Chen, Roll, and
Ross [7] discussed, this is useful when estimating equation (2).
3. Rven when the sample extended to October, some of the estimates
were biased. Dropping those estimates that were biased, we were
left with 31 portfolios over this shorter sample period.
4. The exposures associated with the other factors are available
on request.
5. The asymmetric effect of monetary shocks during recessions and
expansions could be explained if small firms were less able to
reduce nominal wages for those still employed during recessions to
spot market levels than they were able to raise nominal wages for
new hires during expansions to spot market levels.